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Abstract 
Demographic forecasts predict that over the next fifty years the proportion of people in 
New Zealand over the age of 65 will more than double, from 12 percent in 1999 to 26 
percent in 2050. This paper reviews potential economic implications of this demographic 
change in the following broad categories: Demographic change, Labour Markets, Fiscal 
Impacts, Capital Markets, and Long-run economic growth effects.  A synopsis is made of 
the key economic and demographic issues relating to each category, and  the paper 
highlights those issues to be prioritised in further research. 
The paper also questions the existing frameworks and methodologies that have been 
used to study population ageing. Two issues stand out in this regard. Firstly, there is a 
tendency to view population ageing as a “static” phenomenon. The economic implications 
of population ageing are pervasive and complex. Future research may benefit from 
attention to individual behavioural responses to ageing and into the underlying 
demographic dynamics of population ageing.  Secondly, the future economic impacts of 
an ageing population are inherently uncertain. Future research could well incorporate 
methodological approaches that attempt to account for these inherent uncertainties.   
 
JEL CLASSIFICATION  J14 – Demographic Economics; Economics of the Elderly 
J18 – Demographic Economics; Public Policy 
K EYWORDS  Population Ageing; Economics and Demographic Change  
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The Economics of Population 
Ageing 
1 Introduction 
Throughout the world industrialised economies are experiencing a shift in the age 
structure of their populations. The advent of ageing populations will impact considerably 
upon the way in which these economies function. It is difficult, however to be sure what 
the economic implications of ageing populations will be given that it is a globally 
unprecedented phenomenon.  
This paper provides a synoptic view of the economic issues that surround the 
phenomenon of ageing populations. Its goal is to provoke debate and to provide a catalyst 
for discussion on the economic “problem” of population ageing. Particular emphasis has 
been placed on raising issues that require further investigation and on developing a 
framework that will prove useful for further research. 
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we consider demographic changes, 
summarising projections for the New Zealand population and examining the key 
demographic issues that arise out of expected structural changes in the age distribution.  
In the third section of the paper we discuss of the impacts of demographic change upon 
the labour force. In this section, while we consider aggregate participation rates, the 
emphasis is on the interrelationship between individuals’ labour force participation 
decisions and population ageing.  
Section 4 discusses the implications of ageing populations upon the demand for public 
resources and their financing. The section is concluded with brief reference to the role that 
the political process may have upon future demands on public resources. Section 5 
discusses the effect of population ageing upon capital markets, while Section 6 introduces 
some of the salient issues regarding ageing populations and long-run economic growth. 
The final section consists of concluding remarks and suggestions for further research. 
2 Demographic  change 
The age structure of New Zealand’s population is projected to change considerably in the 
first half of this century. This demographic change is a dynamic, multi-faceted  
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phenomenon. The aggregate age structure of our population will change and so will the 
age structure in different regions in New Zealand. Furthermore, these demographic 
changes have the potential to affect and be affected by human behaviour. This section 
seeks to introduce these issues of population ageing, spatial differentials in population 
ageing, and individual ageing, which necessarily underpin any discussion of the 
economics of population ageing. 
2.1 Population  ageing 
Three demographic phenomena summarise age-structural change in New Zealand’s 
population (Statistics New Zealand 2000; 2001c). Firstly, fertility rates have declined to 
sub replacement levels (that is, less than 2.1 births per woman in 1999), which means that 
the base of New Zealand’s age-distribution pyramid is “thinning”. Secondly, fertility rates 
between 1947 and 1973 rose above 3 births per woman for the entire period, peaking at 
4.3 births per woman in the early 1960’s. The first cohorts of this “baby boom” will start to 
retire by the year 2010, and subsequently the age-distribution pyramid is beginning to 
“fatten” at the top. Thirdly, the average life expectancy for newborn males has increased 
from 68.2 years in 1956 to 74.3 years in 1996, and for women there has been an increase 
from 73 years to 79.6 years over the same period. These increases in life expectancy 
further accentuate the fattening at the top of the age-distribution pyramid.  
By the year 2050 we may expect that the number of people in New Zealand over the age 
of 65 will make up 26 percent of the population, up from 12 percent in 1999. Furthermore, 
we may expect a change in the overall population growth rate. If in the future fertility 
remains at a sub-replacement level and migration trends remain the same (an assumed 
net average annual gain of 5000), then the New Zealand population growth rate will move 
into negative figures some time around 2040, with the total population peaking at about 
4.75 million
1
 (Khawaja 2001).  
The most frequently cited summary statistics regarding these projected demographic 
changes are so-called “dependency ratios”. The old-age dependency ratio is the number 
of people over the age of sixty-five relative to the number of working aged people (15-64). 
Similarly we measure the youth dependency ratio as the ratio of the number of people in 
the population less than fifteen years of age relative to the working age population. The 
total dependency ratio is the sum of those people above and below the working age, all 
relative to the number of people in the working age population.  
These conventional definitions of “dependency” provide an incomplete picture. As we shall 
see later individuals are apt to leave the workforce at ages younger than sixty-five. 
Furthermore, the ages at which people join the workforce varies considerably from 
individual to individual; certainly the lower bound of age fifteen leads to an overestimate of 
labour force participation now that compulsory education in New Zealand continues until 
the age of seventeen and rates of tertiary enrolment continue to increase. Also, the 
degree to which people outside the working age population represent a burden upon 
productive members of society depends largely on their needs, such as healthcare or 
education, and respective consumption patterns. 
                                                  
1
   This statistic, along with other projections in this paper for the New Zealand population, is based on 
series four projections from Statistics New Zealand (2000), which assume a total fertility rate of 1.90, an 
increase in longevity of six years between 1999 and 2051 and net annual migration of 5,000 (the historical 
average over the past 100 years).  
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It is possible to create more complex definitions of dependency ratios
2
 but even in their 
crude form they provide readily understood summary statistics of the way in which the 
age-structure of a country’s population is changing (Grimmond 2000). Figure 1 plots the 
projected ratios for New Zealand. From a low point of 50 percent in 2010, the total 
dependency ratio is projected to rise by over 20 percentage points by 2040, with the 
majority of the increase occurring by 2030.  
Source: Statistics New Zealand (2000) Table 3 (Series 4 Projections). 
Demographic projections are, in general, fraught with uncertainties that are important to 
think about when considering the economic implications of population ageing.  The 
number of elderly in New Zealand’s population over the next fifty years can be projected 
fairly accurately given that the relevant cohorts have already been born. However, we 
cannot be sure what the future path of mortality rates will be and so our projections of the 
number of elderly in population carry some degree of uncertainty. Furthermore, fertility 
rates are difficult to project because they are disposed towards major structural change – 
one example being the spike in fertility rates that drove the baby boom.  Subsequently 
projections of the size of the future labour force and hence future dependency ratios carry 
large degrees of uncertainty and this uncertainty grows with the length of the projection 
horizon. 
The current approach for predicting future population changes is to use scenarios based 
on different levels of input variables such as fertility, mortality and migration (Statistics 
New Zealand 2001b). Assumptions are made as to the future levels of these variables and 
scenarios are created where high, low, and medium rates of growth for each variable are 
bundled together. Notably, these static scenario based models do not provide us with a 
measure of the size of likely errors in our projections. As such it is important to recognise 
that while they are useful one ought not to treat them as anything more than projections. 
                                                  
2
   For example, the raw data can be weighted by relative consumption “needs”.  See for example Scobie, 
(2000).  
Figure 1. Projected New Zealand Dependency Ratios. 1999 - 2051
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2.2  Spatial aspects of ageing 
Another important aspect of population ageing in New Zealand concerns the spatial 
differentials in age-structural change. Regions of New Zealand will experience the effects 
of population ageing in different ways depending on their respective age-structures 
currently and inter-regional migration patterns in the future (Lepina 2000).  
Currently, region specific age-structures differ considerably and one of the major drivers of 
this is ethnic composition. For example, Auckland has a large Pacific Island population 
(the largest of any city in the world) and twelve percent of the population is Maori (24 
percent of New Zealand’s total Maori population). These groups have relatively young age 
distributions
3
 (Koopman-Boyden 1993), which means that population ageing will probably 
be less severe in Auckland compared with other regions in New Zealand. Conversely, 
Southland is a region that is predominantly Pakeha - a group that dominates the number 
of elderly in New Zealand.  As such we expect Southland’s population will age at a faster 
rate than Auckland (Koopman-Boyden 1993). 
Future region-specific age-structures are also likely to be shaped by the migration of 
elderly to “retirement zones” in New Zealand. A number of different regions have 
retirement zones in them, often in the periphery of urban areas. These retirement zones, 
referred to as “sun-belts”, will almost certainly grow in years to come. Furthermore “Almost 
all regions that will have a rapid growth in their elderly population are equally well the 
areas whose overall growth will exceed that of New Zealand as a whole”(Lepina 2000, 
p.406). Such a change in the spatial-variation of New Zealand’s population would almost 
certainly have important implications for the economy. 
2.3 Individual  ageing 
Population ageing is being driven by falling fertility rates and rising longevity, a reflection 
of the fact that individuals are living longer and having fewer children. These demographic 
parameters are both affected by and affect how individuals behave over their life cycle 
and subsequently it is important to attempt to understand these, “individual ageing”, 
dynamics if we are to assess the economic impacts of population ageing.  
Studying how individuals behave over their life cycle is an important approach widely used 
for analysing the economics of population ageing.
4
 It allows us to understand the 
dynamics of fundamental economic variables, such as consumption and savings, at the 
individual level. In particular, over-lapping generation (OLG) models allow us to analyse 
life-cycle effects when some people observed in a particular period are in the workforce 
while others are retired
5
. 
 Examining individual behaviour within the OLG framework can often yield insights over 
and above those of more traditional macroeconomic models. For example, a simplified 
view of savings in an economy would suggest that as the proportion of working age 
people in the population declines, so too will total savings in the economy. Conversely, an 
                                                  
3   The age distributions of the Maori and Pacific Island populations are younger than that for Pakeha 
because generally their fertility rates are higher and their life expectancies are lower. 
4
   For an accessible introduction to this approach see Disney (1996, especially Chs. 1 and 3). 
5
   For a recent example of the application of a life cycle model to simulate the effects of ageing on output, 
the current account, savings, debt and investment and the capital stock see Faruqee (2002).  
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OLG model may be constructed that is sensitive to changes in demographic variables 
such as making the savings-consumption decision dependent, in part, on life expectancy. 
As life expectancy increases individuals are apt to increase their individual rate of savings, 
offsetting the reduction in the number of individuals saving as the population ages (Zhang 
2001).   
Modelling the dynamics of human behaviour may prove particularly useful in analysing the 
impacts of policy changes within the context of population ageing. At present there is little 
work being done on this. Some work is being done, however, on microsimulation models 
which, although they do not directly consider human behavioural responses, can be used 




Alternatively attention to the dynamics of individual ageing contributes to understanding 
how economic and social conditions affect demography. There exists an expanding 
literature that focuses on models that explain how fertility is affected by economic and 
social variables (Heckman and Willis 1974; Poot and Siegers 1998). One such model 
suggests that fertility rates in open economies increase with positive changes in long –run 
real interest rates and decline with positive changes in social security and technological 
progress (Becker and Barro 1988). 
3 Labour  force 
The ageing of New Zealand’s population will have profound effects on the size and 
composition of the labour force. The ramifications for the economy are varied and depend 
on how both labour supply and labour demand respond to the age-structural changes in 
the working population. 
3.1 Supply-side  issues 
The growth rate of New Zealand’s working age population is projected to decline 
and become negative by the year 2041 (Statistics New Zealand 2001c). At the 
same time its composition will be changing with the working age population getting 
older, the proportion of Maori and Pacific Islanders in the working age population 
increasing, and labour supply becoming increasingly concentrated in “young” 
regions such as Auckland (Koopman-Boyden 1993).  
                                                  
6
   See for example Harding, (2002).   
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Source: Statistics New Zealand Household Labour Force Survey (Statistics New Zealand INFOS Database). 
The shrinking of the working age population raises the prospect of an economy-wide 
reduction in total labour supply by the middle of this century. However the actual size of 
any reduction will depend critically on future labour force participation rates. Over the past 
fifty years there has been a slight increase in total labour force participation
7
 (see Figure 
2). A long term decline in male participation rates has been offset by an increase in female 
participation rates
8
, however while female rates may continue to rise it is reasonable to 
expect that they will reach a plateau and no longer be the source of a growing labour 
force. 
If we decompose female labour force participation rates by age we find that there is a 
significant reduction in labour force participation rates amongst women over the age of 
fifty. This is in contrast to male participation rates that decline rapidly for workers over the 
age of 60. There is evidence to suggest that this difference in age-specific participation 
rates is a cohort effect. In 1986 the decline of female labour force participation appeared 
to begin at the ages of 40 to 44, whilst in 1992 the change looks to have occurred 
between the ages of 45 and 49. Overall, between 1987 and 1996 there was a 12.3 
percent increase in female labour force participation rates for women between the ages of 
50 to 54 (Dixon 1996). These increases may well be due to cohort specific participation 
rates and what we are seeing in the data is cohorts of women, with higher lifetime 
participation rates, displacing cohorts with lower lifetime participation rates. Subsequently 
we may find that the trend of increasing labour force participation amongst women will 
cease when older cohorts reach retirement age. 
In the absence of female labour force participation driving up overall labour participation 
rates, there is another potential source for growth in the labour supply. Increases in 
                                                  
7
   These rates are inclusive of part-time employment, which has risen considerably relative to full-time 
employment – so an increase in participation rates does not imply proportional increases in labour input per 
working age person. 
8
    The labour force participation rate is defined as the percentage of the working age population that is 
either employed or unemployed  - according to the official definitions of unemployed and employed set out in 
the “Household Labour Force Survey ” (HLFS).  The HLFS defines the working age population as non-
institutionalised, usually resident, civilians aged fifteen or over. 
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longevity indicate that there is potential for an overall increase in labour force participation 
rates amongst older workers as better health extends individual’s productive working lives. 
This is in contrast however, to current trends in labour force participation amongst older 
workers in New Zealand. The average age of retirement has declined over the last fifty 
years with the average age of retirement for men falling from 64.8 in 1950, to 62 in 1995 
and the average age of retirement for women has falling from 61.2 to 58.6 (Auer and 
Fortuny 2000).  
A key question for enquiry then is: What affects the decision to retire? One contributing 
factor is the disincentive to work from the implicit tax rate that workers face around the 
age of retirement. In the case of countries with public pension schemes the decision to 
delay retirement carries the cost of foregone public benefits or higher tax rates, and the 
cost of foregone income from a private pension scheme (for which an extra periods 
contribution may make little or no difference to the level of entitlement post-retirement). 
This sort of implicit tax rate in New Zealand was, when the superannuation surcharge 
applied, estimated to be, on average, twenty-eight percent of gross income (Blondal and 
Scarpetta 1998). Although the surcharge no longer applies a superannuitant would still 
face higher tax rates if he or she chose to work after the age of 65.  
The decision to retire is also related to health, wealth, and education (Haider and 
Loughran 2001) (Quinn 1998). In a study of older workers in the Engineering, Printing, 
and Manufacturing Union in New Zealand respondents were asked what factors they felt 
were important in the decision to retire. The largest response (95.9 percent) was in the 
category of “Your health” and the second largest was “financial security” (McGregor 
2000). Education was not explicitly considered; however the strong correlation between 
education and wealth and income suggests that it is also a factor in the retirement 
decision.  
Equally, uncertainty is an important aspect of the decision to retire (Lumsdaine 1995). 
Individuals are apt to delay retirement in expectation of retiring when conditions are more 
favourable; uncertainty of when such a time will be keeps people in the labour force. In the 
study of older workers cited above, 84.4 percent of respondents considered “the 
increasing cost of living” as an important factor in the decision to delay retirement. 
Although the statement is not an explicit reference to uncertainty the implication is that 
workers are concerned about potential future increases in living costs reducing their living 
standards in retirement.  
The role that uncertainty has in the decision to retire is particularly pertinent for New 
Zealand, where retirement income policy has sought to create certainty in order to allow 
people to plan more easily for retirement. In general one would expect that greater 




There have been few studies of the retirement decision in New Zealand. The debate 
surrounding the economics of population ageing may be significantly enhanced by further 
research on this topic. In particular studies carried out at a microeconomic level or 
qualitative surveys would particularly enhance our understanding of the retirement 
decision, as they are more able to capture the heterogeneity of older workers than 
quantitative studies. The “Employment of the Older Worker Survey”(McGregor 2000) was 
                                                  
9
   Despite increased life expectancy, retirement ages across many OECD countries have tended to fall. 
Disney (1996. Ch.7) explores the extent to which this is a response to more generous (and by implication, 
more certain) social security schemes.  
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a useful addition to the literature in this respect, and microeconometric analyses carried 
out by the OECD (Burkhauser, et al. 1998) also appear quite successful in explaining the 
factors that affect retirement decisions in a way that respects the heterogeneous nature of 
the elderly as a demographic group. 
Another issue that deserves fuller investigation within the New Zealand context is whether 
or not worker productivity declines with age. Analysing changes to the size of the working 
age population represents a fairly simplistic view of labour supply when what is really in 
question is the future supply of labour inputs, not just the number of workers in the 
economy. The median age of people in New Zealand is expected to rise to 45.5 in 2051 
from 34 in 1999 (Statistics New Zealand 2000). We can be fairly certain that there are 
some functions that decline with age, not least of which are cognitive functions such as 
the ability to learn new skills, but older workers often compensate for these things through, 
for example, lower rates of absenteeism. (Campbell 1993) (Auer and Fortuny 2000)
 10
. If a 
negative relationship between age and productivity exists there is at least the potential for 
a decline in output per worker.    
Any such decline could be expected to affect different sectors quite differently, depending 
on the age structure of their workforce. Service sectors employing largely young workers 
might for example experience little change. However, here as in many aspects of 
population ageing, there will probably be a series of dynamic responses and interactions. 
As the overall age structure changes, the relative supplies of labour of different ages and 
skill levels will change, potentially leading to changes in relative wage rates. Firms could 
be expected to adjust the age mix of their workforce in response to these price signals, so 
that the present age structures of employment in particular industries or sectors may well 
evolve.  
In the future we may expect that a larger proportion of the workforce, particularly younger 
workers, will be Maori or Pacific Islanders and this may also affect productivity. Currently 
Maori and Pacific Islanders are proportionately under-represented in tertiary education. 
Were such trends to continue there is a strong likelihood of a decline in productivity from a 
lack of advanced skills in the economy.  






Male 73.2  6 
Female 57.6  5.3 
Pakeha 66.7  4.2 
Maori 62.8  14.2 
Pacific Islanders  60.8  11.3 
Overall 65.1  5.7 
Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2000, p.72 
Furthermore Maori and Pacific Islanders are disproportionately represented in 
unemployment statistics and have lower rates of labour force participation than the 
general population (see Table 1). It is too difficult to say whether such outcomes will 
                                                  
10
   The question of age and productivity is further considered in the sections on labour supply and on long-
run economic growth.  
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persist. However they do raise important questions about the future size of the labour 
force. 
Given it is expected that there will be major regional differences in population age 
structure over the next fifty years, some regions will see their working age population 
decrease more rapidly than others. Although one would expect that the market would 
respond to this with migration out of regions with relatively high labour supply, there is 
potential for substantial labour shortages in those regions with ageing populations, at least 
in the medium term. This too is an area for further enquiry.
11
 
3.2 Demand-side  issues 
The prospect of both a shrinking and an ageing work force poses interesting questions as 
to how employers will respond to these changing demographics. Is age discrimination a 
prevalent factor in the New Zealand labour market and if so will employers, faced with 
declining labour supplies, be proactive in training their older workers and seeking to retain 
their human capital? 
Surveys of employment trends amongst old-age
12
 workers suggest that age discrimination 
may be present in the New Zealand labour market. A recent survey of workers over the 
age of 55 suggests that older workers are passed over for training and promotion on the 
basis of their age (McGregor 2000)
13
, indicating a bias against older employees.  
Of course what may appear to be discrimination against workers on the basis of age may 
in fact be justifiable commercial practices. For instance, there is evidence that wage 
increase demands are an increasing function of age. The “Employment of the Older 
Worker” (McGregor 2000) survey showed 65.3 percent of respondents agreed that “Pay 
should increase automatically with length of service”.  In the same survey 48 percent of 
respondents agreed with the stereotype that “Older workers are more likely to have 
problems with technology”. Thus it may be considered reasonable that training is focussed 
on younger workers, who do not receive, or at least demand, high wages by virtue of their 
length of service, subsequently making the marginal cost of their labour less than older 
workers whilst the marginal benefits of training younger workers are likely to be greater. 
In the case of those older workers who are not currently employed there is evidence that 
they, increasingly, do not have the skills required by employers. Unemployment statistics 
show that people between the ages of 45 and 54 who become unemployed are more 
likely to be long term unemployed - unemployed for a period of twelve months or longer - 
than any other age group; between 1989 and 2000 the proportion of long term 
unemployed who were aged 45 to 54 increased from 30 percent to 46 percent (McGregor 
and Gray 2001).  
These statistics could be seen as indicative of discrimination against older workers, 
however 38 percent of respondents in the “Mature Job Seekers in New Zealand” survey 
claim that “older workers [not having] the right skills” is a major barrier to employment for 
                                                  
11
   See for example Mare, et al (2001).    
12
   Precisely what time of life constitutes “old age” is debateable, but by convention we define older 
workers as those over 55. 
13
   This study provides some support for the presence of age discrimination but is limited due to the fact 
that it surveys the perceptions of workers rather than employers, and is restricted to members of a single 
union.  
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mature job seekers. Also 37 percent of respondents in the same survey say that, 
personally, they do not have sufficient computer skills to gain employment (McGregor and 
Gray 2001, p.19). These statements suggest that high levels of long term unemployment 
amongst older workers is not due to discrimination but due to a lack of marketable skills.  
A lack of marketable skills amongst older workers is, strictly speaking, a supply side issue. 
However it is included in this section because of the evidence that older workers have 
difficulty accessing firm training programmes. It is probable that firms will have to adjust 
training programmes towards the needs of older employees if they are to cope with labour 
(and potentially skill) shortages in the future.  
Finally, one may argue that while employment practices will eventually adjust in response 
to changes in the labour market, organisational cultures do not necessarily adapt in the 
same way that markets do and certainly when they do adapt, a response may only arise 
after a considerable lag
14
.   
4 Fiscal  implications 
The prospect of an ageing population has raised concerns about the future sustainability 
of government fiscal programmes. There is, however, a high degree of uncertainty 
surrounding the future path of demand for public resources. Some areas of expenditure 
will almost invariably expand as a result of population ageing, but at the same time other 
areas of expenditure may shrink.
15
 Furthermore government revenues may also be 
affected by population ageing. 
4.1 Health 
The single largest fiscal issue relating to ageing populations is health care. Health   
comprises a large portion of the government’s expenditure, 19 percent in 2001 (The 
Treasury 2001a), and the elderly consume disproportionate amounts of the country’s 
healthcare resources (see Table 2). Other things equal, a rising old-age dependency ratio 
means that society’s demand for healthcare will rise. This alone may mean a large 
increase in government expenditure. This could be exacerbated if the cost of health care 
were to increase with the increase in demand. 
Increased demand for health resources will come through two channels. Firstly, given 
there will be more people over the age of sixty-five, there will be more individuals in the 
age groups which consume a disproportionate share of health resources. Secondly, if 
trends in longevity continue this is apt to affect the average amount of resources 
demanded by individuals over the age of sixty-five. Quite how this average will be affected 
is not clear; three distinct scenarios present themselves.  
The first we refer to as “prolonged demand”. This scenario assumes that demand for 
health care is a constant linear function of age. Thus average demand will rise for those 
                                                  
14
   The speed and efficacy of organisational change is a matter for debate. As a starting point for insights 
into the nature of organisational culture, change, and organisational learning see Dodgson, M (1993).  
15
   For an assessment across major industrial countries see Helller et al. (1986), and for an Australian 
perspective see Creedy (1998, especially Chs. 2 and 3), and Guest and McDonald (2000).  
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over the age of sixty as a result of sustained levels of demand over increasingly longer 
periods of time.  
The second scenario is that individuals will require the same levels of care that they do 
now, but that there will be a shift in the ages when higher levels of demand present 
themselves. This seems reasonable based on the grounds that individuals consume the 
most health resources close to their death – that is, demand will be “postponed”, not 
prolonged. 
The third is that technological developments in health care will create more efficient and 
more effective treatments. This may result in a relative reduction in demand for healthcare 
resources as unit costs fall.   
Assessing which of these demand scenarios is most likely is a key question for analysts 
and policy makers.  
The first scenario portends the greatest increase in health care expenditure, although it is 
probably the least likely of all three scenarios. The idea that high levels of demand will be 
prolonged fails to take into account the dynamics behind demand for health care. It 
assumes that the present day proportion of health care resources demanded by those 
over sixty four will necessarily expand as people live longer and in doing so neglects the 
fact that if people are living longer they will generally be healthier, and so will demand less 
health care at certain “intermediate” ages, such as between 65 and 74.  
Although our first scenario appears the most unlikely, it is the scenario that underpins 
most all long-term projections of health care expenditure in New Zealand. For example, in 
the Treasury’s Long-term Fiscal Model (LTFM) expenditure on health is adjusted for 
demographic change by allocating cost weights to age groups that broadly reflect each 
group’s consumption of total health expenditure.  
These cost weights are assumed to remain constant in real terms over time, implying 
that the Government commits a constant average level of resources to purchases of 
health per person in a population group 
Woods 2000, p.41 
Consequently the Treasury’s long-term forecasts are apt to overestimate future fiscal 
demands with respect to health care
16
. 
The second scenario (postponed demand) is supported by much of the ageing literature. It 
is based on the argument that, contrary to the first scenario, demand will decline at ages 
where it is now relatively high, due to people being healthier and living longer. This is 
underscored by the claim that age does not necessarily cause ill health. The reasoning 
behind this is that many degenerative diseases that demand a great deal of resources are 
generally due to environmental factors or unnecessarily sedentary behaviour in old-age 
(Campbell 1993). Essentially, the implication is that we can prevent high health costs 
associated with ageing by promoting healthy living and active lifestyles. 
                                                  
16
   This equally applies to other forecasts that use similar techniques – such as the Ministry of Health’s 
long-term expenditure forecasts. See for example Woods (2000). However, in the case of the long term fiscal 
model, it as assumed that unit health costs rise in proportion to real wages (ie a unitary elasticity). There is 
overseas evidence that in fact this elasticity may be exceed one, in which case the model would tens to 
underestimate future costs.  
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This raises the question of future demand for long-term care as people live longer. Over 
the past thirty years the proportion of people in long-term care has remained fairly stable 
(Ashton 2000), however this may change as the proportion people in the population over 
the age of 85 increases. At the present time the proportion of people in long-term 
residential care increases sharply for those over 85 (Ministry of Health 2001) and this 
increase can be attributed to the greater rates of disability that occur at older ages. At the 
same time, although longevity is increasing in most developed countries, the health of 
people over the age of 85 is characterised by illness and disability (European Commission 
Economic Policy Committee 2001). If rates of disability amongst the “very old” do not 
abate it is probable that demand for long-term care will rise at greater rates in the future 
than at present. 
Table 2- Age gender weights for personal health care per head, per year $93/94 
Age Males  Females 
<1 2,661  2,109 
1 to 4  650  515 
5 to 14  344  308 
15 to 24  421  956 
25 to 44  463  1,121 
45 to 64  946  1,016 
65 to 74  3,135  1,860 
75 to 84  3,338  2,860 
85+ 3,911  3,478 
Source: Ministry of Health, Personal Health Funding Formula 1996/97 cited in Bagrie 1997 p. 9. 
The third demand scenario is difficult to assess because it is susceptible to the largely 
immeasurable effects of price and income elasticities in the demand for health care. If 
demand for health care is highly inelastic then efficiency gains that result in lower prices 
will have the effect of lowering overall demand for resources. Conversely if demand for 
health care is highly elastic then this raises the possibility of reductions in unit cost being 
offset by increases in quantities demanded, resulting in an increase in aggregate dollar 
amount of resources demanded.    
There are inherent problems in measuring the elasticity of demand for health care. In 
deciding to visit a doctor or GP, individuals may initially consider the costs of a visit 
against perceived benefits. However, decisions to have further treatments usually arise 
out of physician’s recommendations. As a result it is difficult to determine if individuals 
respond to changes in price or income or if they simply decide to consume health services 
on advice from health professionals. However, it is important that we seek to better 
appreciate elasticity in the demand for health care because of potential future fiscal 
implications.  
Irrespective of which scenario for demand proves most valid, changes to the cost of 
healthcare may be just as profound as changes in demand. Thus we need to consider 
supply side factors and to develop a robust framework within which to analyse the various 
factors that drive the cost of health care, both at the micro and the macro levels. 
Potentially the most important supply side issue for the future cost of healthcare is the 
cost of new technologies and treatments. New technologies and treatments are generally 
more expensive than those that they replace (Lee and Miller 2001) but they offer the 
potential benefits of efficiency gains such as reductions in the number of nights that a  
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patient is required to be in a hospital. However, whether the increased unit cost is larger 
or smaller than the efficiency gain is not always clear, and is treatment specific (Cutler and 
McClellan 2001;McClellan 1996;Newhouse 1994). Subsequently the role of policy in 
determining the speed at which new treatments and technologies are adopted will become 
increasingly important. That is, given expected increases in the demand for health care, a 
rise in unit costs may result in particularly large increases in overall expenditure.  
If we assume that technological progress increases the rate at which health care costs 
rise, then, in the case of the first two demand scenarios, rising costs would mean an even 
greater rise in health care expenditure over the next fifty years. In our third scenario 
(which implies greater efficiency and therefore lower demand) an increase in the cost of 
health care may offset any fiscal benefits of a reduction in demand.  
4.2 Retirement  income 
Public provision of retirement income has been perhaps one of the most widely discussed 
issues relating to ageing populations. This is particularly true for New Zealand where, if 
our current commitment to universal provision of retirement income continues, the effects 
of an ageing population will be considerable.  
The cost of publicly providing retirement income, at the current level of 65 percent of the 
average wage for a married couple, has been projected to exceed 8 percent of GDP over 
the next fifty years, up from 4 percent in 2001 (McCulloch and Frances 2001). This 
represents a significant increase in the claim on public funds in the future. 
Prior to October 2001 New Zealand Superannuation was paid solely out of general 
taxation on a “pay-as-you-go” (PAYG) basis. In October 2001 the government introduced 
the New Zealand Superannuation fund, a partial pre-funding approach to superannuation. 
The fund has been created to smooth the cost of New Zealand Superannuation given the 
large increase in government expenditure that is expected in the future under the PAYG 
approach. Contribution levels for the fund have been calculated under the assumption that 
the current level of payment and age of entitlement will remain at their 2001 levels. It is 
expected that the fund will be drawn upon after the year 2025 and used to meet up to 14 
percent of the cost of universal superannuation (Finance and Expenditure Select 
Committee 2001). 
Policy in recent times has focussed on 65 as the entitlement age for publicly funded 
superannuation. However, better health and increasing longevity for people over the age 
of 65, indicates that an increase in the potential working life of individuals in New Zealand 
will occur. It is possible that policy focussed on a retirement age of 65 will act to offset a 
potential reduction in the old-age dependency ratio (given evidence indicating that 
universal pensions reduce labour force participation and induce early retirement) that 
could otherwise arise out of increases in the potential working lives of New Zealanders. 
This suggests that if the entitlement age for New Zealand superannuation were to be lifted 
over time the fiscal ‘burden’ for the government of funding retirement income could be 
lessened considerably. 
Assuming that the age of eligibility and pension benefits in real terms remain the same 
over time, an increasing old-age dependency ratio implies the tax rate would need to 
increase were the superannuation scheme to be continued to be funded purely as a pay-
as-you-go system. In fact it is precisely with the aim of tax smoothing that a partial pre-
funding of future liabilities has been introduced in New Zealand (Treasury, 2001b). Finding  
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the appropriate settings for public policy for retirement income will likely remain one of the 
key areas for research on the impacts of population ageing. 
4.3  Other age-related expenditure issues 
The literature surrounding the fiscal implications of an ageing population has largely 
focussed on health and pensions. There are, however, other areas of government 
spending, such as education, policing and major capital works, which may be also 
affected significantly by changes in the population’s age structure. 
There are areas of government expenditure that may shrink as a result of ageing 
populations, the most notable of which are spending on law and order and on education. 
Consider the case for spending on policing and prisons. There is a negative correlation 
between crime and age, with people between the ages of fifteen and thirty committing the 
majority of crime (Statistics New Zealand 2001a). If crime continues to be a phenomenon 
associated with younger people, then government may find itself able to reduce funding to 
the police and prisons as the number of young people in New Zealand declines.  
Equally in education, declining relative numbers of young, through falling fertility rates, 
may act to lower the amount of funding needed in that sector, particularly in primary and 
secondary education. Reductions in these areas of expenditure may partially offset future 
increases in the cost of expenditures such as health.  
At the same time, however, demands on government resources to provide public 
infrastructure may act to offset any “gains” from the reduction in demand for policing or 
education. Government funded infrastructure is centred in areas in New Zealand where 
demand for their benefits is greatest. As the distribution of New Zealand’s population 
changes there are likely to be changes to the needs of the population with regard to the 
distribution of said infrastructure. Perhaps the most notable example of this is the 
movement of elderly to areas such as the Bay of Plenty region (Tauranga in particular). It 
is entirely probable that the demand for health services will climb rapidly in this region as 
elderly people migrate there to retire. As a result the government may find that whilst 
expenditure is keeping pace with per capita demand nationally, it may be falling well short 
of demand in given regions. This issue appears to have received little or no attention, to 
date, but may have significant ramifications for government expenditure. 
4.4 Revenue 
As the population ages and the number in the workforce declines first relatively and then 
possibly absolutely, it is plausible to foresee changes in the tax base for income taxes. In 
the face of rising fiscal costs governments will be faced with decisions about how to 
manage the balance and whether increasing tax rates on a declining working population 
to support an ageing population is a feasible and acceptable strategy. Any assessment of 
the implications for revenue must consider the effect of an ageing population on labour 
force participation rates, the patterns of consumption and investment and the forms and 
levels of wealth accumulation. Most of the focus to date has been on the fiscal costs 
associated with ageing – there is relatively little guidance on how revenues might be 
expected to behave.  
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4.5 Income  distribution
17 
Recent changes to the pattern of income distribution in New Zealand have implications for 
fiscal programmes in the years ahead. Population ageing raises questions as to the 
relative income levels and wealth
18
 of the elderly. As the population ages, will the elderly 
become relatively poorer, and would that create increased demand on government 
resources to preserve their incomes relative to the working age population?  
It is evident that the consumption and saving patterns of different age cohorts of the 
population differ markedly. As O’Dea (2000. p45) notes:  
If incomes across the age-range all increase over time at the same real rate, each 
successive cohort should trace out [an income] profile lying above the previous 
cohort… In 1986 there is a sharp break. The income for each cohort falls well below 
that of the cohort 5 years older, instead of continuing above it.  
This pattern may imply changes in the income distribution as these cohorts reach 
retirement. People on low incomes during their working life are likely to be solely reliant on 
government superannuation for retirement income
19
. As such they are also more likely to 
qualify for benefits and less likely to use privately provided health and long term care 
services. Subsequently, if the numbers of individuals with low incomes during their 
working life increases, we may expect an increase in the number of individuals eligible for 
government assistance and demanding government services.  
It is of interest to note however, that those over the age of 60 increased their income 
share between the years of 1983 and 1998 (Hyslop and Mare 2001;O'Dea 2000). 
Again, this increase in income share is probably indicative of cohort effects. Those cohorts 
that retired during the 1990s have, by in large, benefited from the welfare state more than 
any other group in New Zealand’s history (Thomson 1996) and as such one may expect 
that they are, in the aggregate, a relatively wealthy demographic group This serves to 
underscore the importance of the economic and social policies that prevail during the life 
cycle of a particular age cohort. Mounting evidence suggests that their saving and 
consumption behaviour and hence accumulated retirement wealth is shaped by the public 
policies in areas such as superannuation, health, housing, welfare and education.
20
 It is to 
be expected that as the population ages, the distribution of income that will be observed at 
a point in time will reflect the life time experiences of particular cohorts.
21
 
                                                  
17
 For studies in this area see for example Guest and McDonald (1999b and 2002). 
18 Currently there is a paucity of data at the individual household level on assets and liabilities. This may be 
partially overcome by the forthcoming results of a Household Saving Survey. 
19
   This is predicated on the assumption that those individuals who are in the lower percentiles of income 
in retirement are also those who were in the lower percentiles of income during their working life. Conversely, 
the assertion that those retirees in the lower percentiles of income are likely to be solely reliant on government 
superannuation and benefit programmes is evidenced by statistics on retirement income sources – see 
Preston (1999). 
20
   For a fuller discussion of the impact of economic and social conditions and policies on the saving 
behaviour of different cohorts see Gibson and Scobie 2001. 
21
   For a series of studies based on cohort flows see Stone (1999).  
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4.6 Political  economy 
Elderly voters will represent an increasing part of the total electorate as the population 
continues to age. This raises the question of whether elderly constituents will use their 
increased political influence to command a greater proportion of public resources than 
would have been expected based solely on the increase in their absolute numbers.  
New Zealand’s political history provides precedents of situations where agendas that 
favour the elderly have been pursued successfully by interest groups. The Liberal 
government of the 1890s, Labour government in the 1930s, and National in the 1970s all 
instituted public welfare programmes (predominantly retirement income policies) in 
response to the demands of elderly constituents (Levine and Roberts 1993). In particular 
the National government’s superannuation scheme of the mid 1970s increased 
superannuation payment both in absolute terms and relative to other benefits.  
It is intuitively appealing to argue that elderly voters will be able to exert sufficient political 
pressure in the future to bias the allocation of public resources towards services and 
goods that they favour; such as health services and income transfers in the form of 
retirement income. This presumption is far too simplistic. It ignores the fact that the elderly 
are a heterogeneous group who, by in large, have very divergent views on the role of 
government and on government expenditure. The notion that “the elderly” are a coherent 
constituency with a unified agenda, although often used by political commentators, is a 
misnomer. 
In fact, contrary to commonly held presumptions, there is evidence that increasing 
dependency ratios may lead to a reduction in the size of the welfare state. An analysis of 
data for the United States and twelve Western European countries (1965 – 1992) has 
yielded a negative correlation between dependency ratios and labour taxes and the size 
of social transfers (Razin, et al. 2001). Such analysis is fraught with specification 
problems, the most obvious being the widespread dismantling of government welfare 
programmes in the 1980s, due largely to political and economic changes which cannot be 
effectively controlled for. Nevertheless, the results can be shown to be consistent with 
theoretical models of the political economy and they suggest that simplistic views of the 
political economy of population ageing are flawed. 
Thus, while intuitively appealing, there is no strong evidence to suggest that public 
resources will be “captured” by vocal elderly interest groups as the population ages.  
5 Capital  markets 
Throughout the developed world, as the baby-boomer cohorts reach retirement they will 
begin to draw down on investments made over their lifetime to support themselves. At the 
same time reductions in the size of the labour force may result in lower levels of savings
22
. 
Changes in the flows of saving and investment translate into changes in the current 
account balance. As a result we may expect changes to both domestic and international 
                                                  
22
   Changes in the level of savings are analysed by Guest and McDonald (2001a,b and c).  
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capital markets that could be reflected in fundamental changes to asset prices, interest 
rates, and capital flows between countries and regions
23
.  
5.1 Domestic  markets 
In considering the effects of population ageing on domestic capital markets we must bear 
in mind that in a small open economy such as New Zealand’s, it is difficult to sustain a 
distinction between domestic capital markets and international markets. The distinctions 
drawn on here pertain to investment in relatively immobile forms of capital, such as 
housing; effects ageing populations may have on domestic investment demand; and the 
effects that population ageing may have on New Zealand’s risk premium through changes 
to domestic savings rates. 
Firstly, consider the possibility of changes in New Zealand’s country risk premium. This 
premium is dependent on a perceived level of risk that is a function, in part, of domestic 
savings levels and the balance in our current account. That is there is a positive 
relationship between a country’s current account deficit and the risk premium that it 
attracts: the lower national savings is, the higher the current account deficit, the higher the 
risk premium (Cantor and Packer 1996;O'Donovan, et al. 1996). This suggests that the 
future level of national savings may have an affect on the future cost of capital in New 
Zealand. 
It is not clear whether savings will fall or increase as a result of population ageing. One 
argument is that, all other things being equal, a reduction in the working age population 
will lead to lower individual saving and thus less aggregate saving. On the other hand, 
increasing longevity may raise the rate at which individuals save during their lifetime 
(Zhang 2001), with the potential to offset a reduction in the number of savers in the 
economy. The former argument receives the most support in the literature but it is 
founded on contentious assumptions about the rate at which the elderly consume their 
wealth during retirement.   
Bloom, Canning and Graham (2002) add both health and longevity to a standard model of 
life cycle savings. They find that increased longevity tends to lead to higher savings at all 
ages. In a stable population these extra savings are offset by the higher old age 
dependency ratio – there are simply relatively fewer workers to retirees. However, their 
model explains the high saving rates observed in Asia, where increased life expectancy 
has been combined with declining youth dependency to lead to abnormally high rates of 
saving which are expected to be reversed in future. 
If individuals attempt to consume all of their wealth during their lifetime, with bequests 
arising only because of their inability to predict their health status and length of life, then 
the effect of an ageing population on savings may be large. If, on the other hand, the 
elderly have a strong bequest motive we may expect that this effect will be mitigated. 
Studies have sought to explore such retirement behaviour using neoclassical overlapping-
generations models, however they have used US data and their findings are not 
particularly robust (Yoo 1997) (Abel 2001). For New Zealand, data from the Household 
Savings Survey, currently being completed, could prove very useful in helping us to gain a 
better picture of the behavioural dynamics at the household level. 
                                                  
23
   Higgins and Williamson  (1996) and Higgins (1998) provide models of changes in international capital 
flows as a result of demographic changes. Guest and McDonald (1999a) examine the case of five ASEAN 
countries, while Besanger, Guest and McDonald (2000) review the case of Asia.  
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How the elderly consume their wealth in retirement may also have interesting effects on 
investment demand and hence asset prices in New Zealand. There is a possibility that as 
the number of elderly in the New Zealand economy grows we will see more individuals 
drawing down on their asset wealth to obtain retirement income. If this were to be the 
case we may expect the supply of investment goods to increase with the potential to lower 
prices as a result (Siegel 1994).  
Not all assets are equal and so asset prices and their determinants differ across classes 
of asset. Bearing this in mind, the dynamics of falling asset prices may depend on how 
individuals choose to store their wealth in old age. One school of thought says that as 
people get older they favour fixed income returns. As such, population ageing could 
create high demand for government bonds while the demand for equities could fall. 
Furthermore, an increase in demand for fixed return assets would reduce the real returns 
from those assets (England 2000) with net result being a dilution of the retirement stock of 
wealth.   
In New Zealand where the lion’s share of household wealth is held in housing
24
 (Claus 
and Scobie 2001) there is a very real prospect of wealth dilution. Over time one might 
expect that, as the population ages and the number of people owning their own home 
increases, house prices will fall
25
. In the case of other classes of assets the capital may be 
moved offshore or into other sectors to seek out more favourable returns. For housing 
assets this is not the case. Supply may well outstrip demand, with downward pressure on 
prices and consequently the wealth of New Zealand retirees
26
.  
A simplistic view of capital markets says that the prices of most all assets will fall around 
2020 as the baby boomer cohorts retire en mass (Siegel 1994), but there is evidence 
contradicting this view. Poterba has conducted a survey of asset prices in the United 
States and finds that there is only a weak link between demographics and asset prices 
(1998 and 2000). No similar study has been conducted in New Zealand but such a study 
could prove very useful in understanding the implications of ageing for capital markets.  
5.2 International  markets 
As a small open economy the movement of international interest rates and capital flows 
will dominate what happens in New Zealand capital markets. To obtain a clear picture of 
what will occur in the global economy we must consider the effects of ageing on 
economies throughout the world, and the different rates at which countries are ageing. 
As populations age their capital to labour ratios will rise and returns to capital will fall. 
Assuming capital becomes relatively more abundant (relative to labour) in developed 
economies then there would most likely be greater capital flows into developing 
economies with younger populations, lower capital to labour ratios, and higher returns to 
capital (Borsch-Supan, et al. 2001).  
                                                  
24   Home ownership makes up an average 85 percent of household assets in New Zealand.   
25   Siegel (1994) summarises the problem facing baby boomers who want to liquidate assets to fund 
retirement by saying: “Sell? Sell to whom?” p. 41 . 
26   For an argument to the contrary see Venti et al. (2001)  who argue that people do not draw down on 
housing wealth to obtain retirement income. This is a study of US data and thus not necessarily applicable to 
New Zealand.  
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The potential for movement of capital out of developed economies is also dependent on 
domestic savings and investment demand differentials. Other things equal we can expect 
that, over the next twenty years, per capita savings in New Zealand will increase due to a 
rise in the relative number of people in the economy between the ages of forty and sixty-
four (during which time the majority of life time savings occurs (Gibson and Scobie 2001)).  
If this increase in domestic savings is greater than investment demand capital will move 
offshore with the potentially positive effect of pushing New Zealand’s current account into 
surplus (England 2000) (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
1988). Of course this is dependent on an excess of investment demand from other 
countries with relatively younger populations. 
Whether or not developing economies can in fact absorb large capital flows out of ageing 
developed countries, at existing interest rates, is unclear. If they cannot then we may 
expect an oversupply of capital in the global economy, driving down world interest rates. If 
they can readily absorb large amounts of capital then the world interest rate may even rise 
(Borsch Supan 1996) (Turner and Richardson 1998). 
These things we may expect in the medium term (circa 2020) whilst in the long run there 
is a possibility of a global decline in savings rates (Heller and Symansky 1997) and a 
subsequent decline in world growth rates. For developed countries such as New Zealand 
this presages a return to high current account deficits and a reduction in our share of 
global output. 
6  Long run economic growth 
Economic growth depends on range of factors, including economic policies, investment in 
human capital, and innovation; these fall largely outside the scope of this paper. However 
population ageing may affect economic growth through its potential effects on saving, 
investment, the stock of capital, and on labour. 
6.1  Investment and capital  
Most economists agree that capital accumulation affects long-run economic growth. There 
is considerable disagreement, however, over what kinds of capital investment are most 
desirable for enhancing economic growth and over what the determinants of capital 
accumulation are.  
One determinant of capital accumulation that is closely associated with population ageing 
is domestic savings. One school of thought suggests that low domestic savings levels 
induce high real interest rates
27
 and crowd out private investment in physical capital, 
hence constraining economic growth (Crocombe, et al. 1991). However, this sort of 
argument does not give full consideration to New Zealand’s position in the world as a 
small open economy.  At the present time, studies of economic growth in small open 
economies have failed to provide evidence of a link between domestic savings, capital 
accumulation, and economic growth
28
.  
                                                  
27   See the argument regarding risk premiums and current account deficits in Section 5.1. 
28   See for example, Claus, et al. (2001).  
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The types of investment favoured by ageing populations may adversely affect economic 
growth. In the previous section we noted the argument that people in old age prefer to 
invest in fixed return assets such as government debt. This has important implications for 
growth because it is variable return investments such as investment in equipment that 
yields the greatest benefit in terms of economic growth (Ahn and Hemmings 2000) (De 
Long and Summers 1991).  
Future investment will also be affected by consumption demand from within the domestic 
economy and as such growth may be adversely affected by changing consumption 
patterns in an ageing economy. Arguably the elderly demand fewer manufactured goods 
than those in the working age population and as such we may see an increase in the 
proportion of GDP stemming from services. Productivity growth in the service sector is 
typically lower than that for say manufacturing, which benefits more readily from advances 
in technology. Thus we may find that growth rates will decline from a decline in total factor 
productivity stemming from changes in the sectoral output mix induced by population 
ageing.  
Conversely, there is potential for elderly consumption patterns in ageing countries to 
enhance long-run growth in New Zealand. An increase in demand from developed 
countries for consumables such as commodities could increase trade volumes or prices 
and hence increase per capita incomes.    
Also, population ageing may increase long-run growth in per capita incomes through a 
capital-concentration effect. In countries such as New Zealand, where we expect a 
reduction in the working age population, the level of capital per worker should rise. It is not 
clear precisely what the implications of this will be, but it may result in increased labour 




Future changes to labour supply and to labour productivity could have a large impact on 
New Zealand’s growth path. The projected reduction in the labour force means that there 
will be a reduction in labour inputs such that, all other things equal, there will be a 
reduction in per capita GDP.  
Using a theoretical growth accounting model we can analyse, albeit rudimentarily, the 
effects on potential GDP growth rates of a reduction in the labour force. One such model, 
based on an aggregate production function for the economy, is: 
GDP growth rate = (1-α)(labour growth rate)+α(capital growth rate) + total factor 
productivity   
where α is the proportion of GDP that constitutes returns to capital.  
In 1996 the Treasury estimated a potential growth rate of 3.3 percent for the New Zealand 
economy using this simple formula (The Treasury 1996). This was based on estimated 
annual growth in the capital stock of 2.4 percent, growth in labour supply of 1.4 percent, 
returns to capital of 0.4, and total factor productivity of 1.5 percent.
30
 All other things 
                                                  
29
   This is essentially the reverse of an increase in the population which would be expected to reduce 
productivity through diminishing marginal productivity. 
30
   It is, however, the dynamics of the illustration that is important rather than the value of the estimates.  
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equal, a reduction in the labour force growth rate of 25 percent would reduce the potential 
GDP growth rate to 3.1 percent. If the labour force were to actually shrink in the longer 
term, the potential growth rate would, according to this approach, reduce further. Any such 
reduction in GDP growth rates, with its commensurate impact on living standards could be 
offset, however, by an increase in productivity.  
Historically, labour productivity has grown at a fairly conservative annual average rate of 
1.35 percent between 1960 and 1998 (see Figure 3). In order to sustain future rates of 
economic growth at levels which offset the effect of rising old-age dependency, 
productivity growth would need to accelerate.   
The creation of a highly skilled workforce through education is one area that may enable 
labour productivity to keep pace with the declining labour force. Indeed Lucas’s model of 
endogenous growth suggests that investment in human capital through effective 
education is fundamental to long run economic growth. If this is the case then it poses 
very important questions as to how our education system will perform over the next fifty 
years.  
Source: Dalziel and Lattimore 1999 p. 65 
The market for education may be affected by population age structural change. An 
increasing capital to labour ratio indicates that wages will rise in future relative to returns 
to capital. This has the propensity to affect individual choices to invest in higher education 
depending on changes to the returns to unskilled labour relative to the returns to skilled 
labour.  
The cost of education may be seen as both the cost of fees, including the cost of capital 
associated with either debt or equity financed fee payment, and income foregone whilst 
studying. Thus an increase in the returns to unskilled labour implies an increase in the 
cost of education whilst a reduction in the cost of capital implies a reduction in the cost of 
education. Conversely the return on education, seen as the extra income an individual can 
expect to receive over their lifetime, is dependent on the returns to skilled labour
31
.  
Therefore if the returns to skilled labour rise relative to the returns to unskilled labour, then 
we may expect increased investment in education in the economy.  
                                                  
31
   Returns to skilled labour are also affected by progressive tax rate schedules and the ability of 
individuals. For further discussion see Creedy (1995). 
 
Figure 3.    Labour Productivity Growth:
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Welch (1979), in a study of the earnings of baby boomers in the United States, finds 
evidence that an increase in a cohort’s size reduces a cohort’s earnings. Furthermore the 
study found that as cohort size increased, the differential in earnings between educated 
and non-educated workers reduced. This suggests that there may indeed be an increase 
in the returns to skilled labour relative to unskilled, as the working age population shrinks. 
The corollary of this is that there may be greater investment in education contributing to 
higher levels of human capital and potentially higher productivity and output growth in the 
economy. 
7 Concluding  remarks 
Population ageing has the potential to become the single biggest economic and policy 
issue of the next fifty years. As such future policy needs to be developed within a 
framework that recognises the potential ramifications of population ageing. This paper 
highlights some of the key issues that need to be addressed within such a framework, but 
it is by no means comprehensive. It is evident that the economics of population ageing is 
an area still replete with conjecture that requires further investigation. 
The economic analysis of population ageing has two branches: one macroeconomic 
where we seek to elucidate the impact on the growth and productivity of the economy 
stemming from changing patterns of saving and investment, capital flows and changes in 
the labour market. The second or microeconomic branch, considers the income, 
consumption and saving of individuals over their lifecycle in the face of reduced fertility 
and greater longevity. 
In seeking to better understand the economics of population ageing we must set the 
boundaries of our analysis within a demographic framework. This requires first identifying 
the range of demographic issues that make up population ageing. In section three spatial 
and behavioural aspects of labour force participation were raised, and these require 
further analysis. In particular the declining retirement age is of concern and it highlights 
the importance of examining the behavioural effects of policy within the contexts of 
population ageing. 
Of course predicting and assessing the effects of population ageing on policy is 
problematic and carries with it a great degree of uncertainty. This is particularly true for 
assessing the fiscal implications of population ageing. The impact of population ageing on 
government spending such as expenditure on health care is largely an unknown and all 
that we can do is to focus our enquiry on the factors that drive demand for public 
resources. 
In some instances however there is scope to evaluate fiscal impacts within fairly robust 
frameworks. One such case is the effects of population ageing on government revenue. In 
particular robust methodologies, such as microsimulation models, exist within which to 
examine whether or not the tax base will be eroded in the absence of a capital gains tax
32
. 
Furthermore, the prediction of future fiscal impacts will be enhanced if the analytical 
framework used includes stochastic elements.  
In particular the use of stochastic budget forecasts could offer the benefit of being able to 
take account of the inherent uncertainty in our forecasts and explore the implications for 
                                                  
32   See for example Harding, (2002).   
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fiscal outcomes. This can add to the current scenario based approach because it allows 
us to estimate and interpret the size of errors surrounding our forecasts and to quantify 
the uncertainty that surrounds future economic impacts of population ageing
33
.  
Assessing long run impacts requires understanding the broader environment within which 
economic and political activity takes place. This paper has raised the role that political 
economy might have on future government expenditure, but has not explained other 
potential political economy or social aspects of population ageing. Nevertheless one 
should not underestimate their importance. 
The potential effects of population ageing on capital markets is an area which will require 
close monitoring. As populations in different regions age at differential rates, it is to be 
expected that imbalances in national or regional savings and investment will generate 
capital flows and changes in international asset prices. New, because of its small size, will 
not have any significant effect on these flows but will be subject to the influence of 
changes in process in international markets. 
In the case of domestic capital markets the issue requiring the most attention is that of 
asset prices. The potential for retirement wealth dilution if asset prices fall carries 
significant implications for many areas of policy and as such deserves fuller investigation. 
The effect that population ageing has on capital markets will almost certainly feed through 
to long run economic; this is indicative of the pervasiveness of the economic 
consequences of population ageing. Although focussing research upon a single economic 
issue is helpful if only for brevity’s sake, any future research should necessarily respect 
that fact that the issues surrounding the economics of population ageing are broadly 
related. This includes recognising that although macro-level data conveniently 
summarises general trends, it does not allow us to understand behavioural responses to 
demographic changes. Indeed expanding our understanding of behavioural responses to 
demographic change should be a priority in further research.  
                                                  
33   See for example Lee, et al. (2001) and Creedy and Alvarado (1998).  
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